Workshop on subjective perspectives

Welcome to the workshop Subjective perspectives,
Umeå University, November 28-29, 2024.

All interested are welcome to this event. Sign up by emailing Pär Sundström no later than November 23.

Preliminary schedule

Thursday November 28 (room: HUM.J.118)

1040-1050 Welcome

1050-1200 Susanna Schellenberg

Lunch 

1320-1430 Fabiana Caserta

Coffee

1450-1600 Steve Humbert-Droz

1830: Dinner at Sjöbris

Friday November 29 (rooms: HUM.F.134 – Lingvisten and HUM.J.118)

1030-1140 Sofia Jeppsson (room: HUM.F.134 – Lingvisten)

In the interlude here, Susanna Schellenberg gives a talk at #frAIday 12:15-13:00. TAIGA provides wraps for those who attend the talk, but to secure a wrap, make sure you sign up for lunch on this day.

1400-1510 Pär Sundström (room: HUM.J.118)

I think there will be a workshop-related “journal club” meeting around 1600 here too.

1830: Dinner at RåBra

Organiser: Pär Sundström

Abstracts

Decentred Selves: Depersonalization and the Phenomenology of Displacement Fabiana Caserta, Umeå University

Abstract: Depersonalization (DP) and derealization (DR) are psychological phenomena that denote, respectively, states characterized by a sense of detachment from oneself and one’s surroundings. In recent times, DP and DR, in conjunction with the resultant chronic condition termed Depersonalization- Derealization disorder (DDD), have increasingly attracted the interest of philosophers. Nevertheless, comprehensive accounts elucidating the nuances of the phenomena remain scarce. This presentation delineates a preliminary pathway such an account may follow, establishing a distinction between two available exploratory approaches: ab initio and in medias res. Subsequently, I will delineate a tentative treatment of DP that addresses both forms of explanation. I will identify decentredness as the experiential modality that most accurately encapsulates the fundamental features of depersonalization. Building upon an existing proposal, I will investigate an alternative account of the mechanisms underlying the emergence of alienated states.

What could a pure thinker think? Pär Sundström, Umeå University

Abstract: Could someone or something that has never sensed anything and never had even the capacity to sense anything still think something? David Chalmers (2023) argues that such a “pure thinker” is possible but that their thought capacities would be relatively limited. Pure thinkers would be, he claims, “largely structuralist thinkers”. I shall argue that, if a pure thinker is possible at all, then it’s also possible for such a thinker to have a richer range of thought capacities than Chalmers maintains. A pure thinker could for example, if they are at all possible, have “full understanding” of the concept red. I may also discuss implications of this argument for Thomas Nagel’s (1974, 1986) distinction between “objective” and “subjective” points of view.

Autonomous/isolated epistemology Sofia Jeppsson, Umeå University

Abstract: I have previously published on a phenomenon I call Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. It’s doubt about reality, doubt about things so basic that they qualify as “hinges” to the hinge epistemologist, doubt that is too radical to be alleviated by proofs and arguments that rely on science or common sense. I have also shown that well-known anti-sceptical arguments from epistemology become irrelevant to the madperson in the grip of RPD, since such arguments, at best, shows that people who already trust “mainstream reality” are justified in doing so.
In the published paper on Radical Psychotic Doubt, I discuss philosophical strategies for dealing with it; Jamesian pragmatism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. I’m now working on combining Kantian transcendental arguments with Chalmer’s theory of reality. However, I was asked how other people fit into this. Going back to Descartes, Kant, and the enlightenment in general, epistemology was conceived of as a solo project. A lone individual tries to find a firm basis for
knowledge. Now, we have social epistemology as its own field, and more generally, the atomistic enlightenment approach has fallen out of fashion. So how do other people factor in?

This is an interesting point. However, certain states of madness can force you into an isolated bubble where you have no choice but to approach these issues on your own. I want to examine, first, how to understand this isolation in more detail. It does not turn you into Kaspar Hauser. You will retain knowledge gained from growing up among people. Nevertheless, there is some sense in which other people’s testimony and perspectives become irrelevant. Second, I want to examine the possibility that being forced into working things out on your own, as distressing as it may be, can be valuable as well. Plausibly, a few psychotically doubting madmen can provide instrumental value to philosophy as a whole by adding more diverse intuitions, arguments and perspectives. In addition, there may be an intrinsic value that autonomous knowledge-seekers manifest, comparable to Nguyen’s autonomous art appreciator. There are certainly many differences, but I want to examine the possibility that there might also be an interesting parallel.

Imagination and the aphantasics’ perspective Steve Humbert-Droz, Umeå University

Abstract: What role does sensory imagination play in the mind? Historically seen as essential for any representation (Hume 1739), sensory imagination has more recently been viewed as a mere epiphenomenon (Neisser 1967; Dennett 2007). Determining an aim for S(ensory)-imagination that would lie somewhere between these two extremes is notoriously challenging (Langland-Hassan 2015). Yet insights from aphantasia — a condition where individuals seem unable to imagine sensory experiences — may provide insight into the advantages that S-imagination offers.
In this paper, (1) after identifying the difficulties in establishing a purpose for S-imagining, I (2) examine three of the most popular positions on this purpose: simulationism, representationalism, and modalism. I then (3) present the case of aphantasia and draw the following lesson: each of the three options takes a perception-like approach to S-imagining and its relationship with its aim, failing to capture S-imagining specificity. In the final section (4), I propose a new modalist account according to which S-imagination does not track possibilities (in a perception-like, Mind-to-World, way) but rather renders its content possible (or experienciable). I show that this approach not only aligns with data on aphantasics but also establishes clear norms for S-imagination that are unique to it.

TBA Susanna Schellenberg, Rutgers University

Abstract: coming soon