The Research Seminar Series in Philosophy invites you to a seminar with Victor Moberger, ”Moral Fictionalism: How and Why?”.
Abstract: The central challenges for moral fictionalism are twofold: first, to explain how its recommendation that we abandon moral belief and assertion can be reconciled with its rationale of preserving the motivational efficacy of moral thought and discourse; second, to explain what the point is of replacing moral belief and assertion to begin with. I clarify these challenges and argue that Richard Joyce’s recent “metaphorist” version of fictionalism fares no better with respect to them than his earlier “narrationist” version. Just like its narrationist predecessor, metaphorist fictionalism fails to secure the motivational efficacy of moral thought and talk. I also find faults with yet more recent attempts at answering the above challenges for moral fictionalism, leaving the conservationist recommendation a more attractive alternative. This conclusion could be overturned if the conservationist proposal were sufficiently problematic in other respects, but I argue that it isn’t.
All interested are welcome to participate in this seminar.
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