Mark Windsor: Can Hallucinations Be Aesthetically Valuable?

The Research Seminar Series in Philosophy invites you to a seminar with Mark Windsor, Uppsala, "Can Hallucinations Be Aesthetically Valuable?".

Abstract: Many people count hallucinations among the most rewarding aesthetic experiences they have had. Yet, if hallucinations can be aesthetically valuable, that appears to be inconsistent with one of two main views regarding the nature of aesthetic value. ‘Aesthetic value empiricism’ is the view that the fundamental bearers of aesthetic value are experiences. The contrary view, the ‘object theory’, holds that the fundamental bearers of aesthetic value are objects. In this paper, I use hallucinations to argue for aesthetic value empiricism. First, I establish the debate between empiricists and object theorists in aesthetics and situate hallucinations in relation to a problem for empiricism concerning the ‘heresy of separable value’. Second, I present reports of hallucinations describing them as being highly aesthetically rewarding. Third, I defend the claim that hallucinations can be aesthetically valuable by rejecting several reasons that might be adduced for denying that they can be. Fourth, I argue that, contra the object theory, the aesthetic value of hallucinations cannot be explained by reference to any objects that exist outside of experience. Finally, I suggest a way that the empiricist can respond to the heresy of separable value.

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