The Research Seminar Series in Philosophy invites you to a seminar with Lars Samuelsson, who will speak on the topic of "A Response to the Entanglement Problem for Idealization Theories in Moral Philosophy".
Abstract: Idealization theories in moral philosophy are theories according to which normative facts somehow depend on facts about some responses that would be had by some hypothetical agent in some counterfactual idealized conditions. Perhaps the most well-known version of this kind of view is the so-called ideal observer theory, which analyses moral statements in terms of responses of a hypothetical agent who is omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and, in other respects, normal (Firth 1952). In a paper titled “The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy”, Olle Risberg raises a problem targeting all idealization theories in moral philosophy by virtue of their very structure (Risberg 2018). Hence, it is – in that respect – a particularly pressing problem for anyone attracted to idealization theories of any kind in moral philosophy, as it cannot be solved by simply improving any such view, or by formulating a new, better version. It threatens the kind of view as such.
Risberg argues that there are possible cases, entanglement cases, in which an agent ought to perform a certain action if and only if it would not be affirmed, recommended, or otherwise positively endorsed, by an idealized agent. In this talk, I argue that – elegant as Risberg’s argument is – it fails to undermine idealization theories. The case he provides as an example of an entanglement case is in fact not an entanglement case, and the reason why it is not an entanglement case strongly indicates that there are no such cases.
(If all this sounds dull, it can be worth mentioning that the talk will also involve a threatening demon, a tasty apple, and an agent who really likes apples… what a plot!)
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