The Research Seminar Series in Philosophy invites you to a seminar with Karl Bergman, Umeå University, ”Rationality without transparency”.
Abstract: Some philosophers have argued that semantic externalism contradicts a certain received view about rationality. This received view consists in two claims: 1) that in order to be rational, a subject must conform her attitudes to the rules of logic (e.g., avoid contradictions among her beliefs); 2) that a subject has transparent epistemic access to whether or not her attitudes meet the requirements of rationality. In defense of the latter “principle of transparency”, writers sometimes appeal to the purported normativity of rationality. The normativity of rationality, it is said, presupposes that we have control over whether or not we are rational, and this in turn presupposes transparency. In this paper, I argue that insofar as rationality is normative in the sense that presupposes control, this actually speaks against the principle of transparency.
All interested are welcome to participate in this seminar.
