The Research Seminar Series in Philosophy invites you to a seminar with Karin Enflo, "A Metaethical Trilemma"
Suppose that there are moral facts. Suppose, for example, that it is a moral fact that we ought not to torture animals. What kind of fact is this? A possible answer is that it is an objective fact, a fact that is independent of our attitudes, and also a prescriptive fact, a fact that tells us what to do. The fact that we ought not to torture animals is thus independent of our attitudes to animal torture and it tells us not to torture animals. Moral facts are both objective and prescriptive. But this sounds weird. Prescriptions, such as orders and recommendations, are subjective in nature – are they not? They are given by humans – or perhaps gods – and are thus dependent on attitudes. Objective prescriptions would be weird – so weird that they cannot really exist! However, another possible answer is that a moral fact is a subjective fact, a fact dependent on attitudes – our attitudes or perhaps the attitudes of gods or ideal observers. The fact that we ought not to torture animals might be the fact that an ideal observer would tell us not to torture animals. Initially this sounds reassuring (the observer is ideal, after all). But then we might wonder why an ideal observer would tell us not to torture animals. Since moral facts are nothing over and above what an ideal observer would tell us to do, there are no prior moral facts that an observer could point to as their reason. Thus there is nothing more for the ideal observer to say than “Because I say so!” This does not sound very reassuring! Moral facts now seem arbitrary. Facing this problem we might attempt a third possible answer: moral facts are not subjective and arbitrary, since they are objective, but they are not weird either, since they are natural. They are thus knowable by empirical methods. The fact that we ought not to torture animals might be the fact that torture causes pain and that animals do not want to feel pain and that we can avoid animal torture etc. But wait – what happened to the prescriptive ought here? Oughtness is not a natural property, is it? We do not have any empirical methods that reveal what we ought to do – right? So, now we face a trilemma: Moral facts are weird, arbitrary or not really prescriptive. How should be deal with this trilemma? In my talk I will give an outline of how I believe that the trilemma (in part) can be resolved.
All interested are welcome to participate in this seminar.
Learn more about the seminar series in Philosophy and upcoming events
