Epistemology and meta-epistemology workshop

Welcome to Umeå Winter Workshop in Philosophy: Epistemology and Metaepistemology. This workshop is oper to all who are interested, more information under the heading Registration below.

Program

Wednesday the 29th of November

11.30-1300: Lunch at the Little Indian

13.15-14.25. HUM.H.119. Hugo Hellström (Umeå) ”Expressivism & skepticism”

14.45-15.55. HUM.H.119. Ylwa Sjölin Wirling (Göteborg) “No virtuous insulation: A dilemma for veritism”

18.30 Dinner

Thursday the 30th of November

9.45-10.55. HUM.H.119 Andrew Peet (Umeå) ”Interpretation and Inquiry”

11.15.12-25. HUM.H.119. Nick Hughes (Oslo) ”Non-Ideal Epistemic Rationality”

12-30-14.40. Lunch at Universum

14.40-15.50. HUM.G.217.Olle Risberg (Uppsala) ”Pluralism about Philosophical Progress”

18.30 Dinner

Abstracts

Expressivism and skepticism  (Hugo Hellström)

There is a class of skeptical problems that, on one diagnosis, arise due to realist assumptions among epistemologists. In this talk, I will examine whether meta-epistemological expressivism can better handle these skeptical arguments. The potential upshot is that meta-epistemological expressivism can alleviate at least some skeptical worries.

Non-Ideal Epistemic Rationality (Nick Hughes)

Abstract: Many theories of epistemic rationality make no special dispensations for cognitive limitations. As a result, they often make demands that only cognitively ideal agents could satisfy. But none of us is, or ever will be, cognitively ideal. This gives rise to a question: given that we can’t think like cognitively ideal agents, how should we think? In this talk, I’ll sketch the outlines of a reliabilist theory of non-ideal epistemic rationality, which attempts to answer this question, and argue that, if it is on the right track, the recently popular idea that the standards of non-ideal epistemic rationality are fixed by social conventions cannot be right.

“Interpretation and Inquiry” (Andrew Peet)

It is natural to think of interpretation as a species of inquiry - inquiry into meaning. That is, to interpret a X (where X could be an utterance, a text, a cultural artifact etc.) is to engage in inquiry directed at the question “what does this X mean?” or “what is the meaning of X?”. In this talk I will argue that interpretation is not a species of inquiry. A new theory of interpretation is required.

“No virtuous insulation: A dilemma for veritism” (Ylwa Sjörlin-Wirling)

This talk interrogates the idea of a virtue-first approach to the question of what has fundamental epistemic value. It has been suggested that a virtue-first approach is needed to strengthen the view known as veritism, according to which only truth has fundamental epistemic value. I distinguish between an ontological and a methodological virtue-first approach, and suggest that only the latter is an attractive option for a veritist. I then argue that the methodological virtue-first approach is incompatible with the idea that the epistemic domain is insulated, in the sense that being of epistemic value does not entail being of value. But insulationism is arguably an important tool for veritists in meeting various objections to their view, aside from being considered generally attractive by many. Veritists thus face a dilemma that requires them to give up one of two arguably attractive tools in their kit: either the virtue-first motivation of their view, or the insulationist conception of epistemic value. 

Pluralism about Philosophical Progress (Olle Risberg)

Along with the lively discussions about whether and to what extent philosophy is making progress, there is also an emerging debate about what philosophical progress is or consists in. One possible view is the Popperian one that philosophical progress consists in adopting philosophical theories that are closer to the truth than their predecessors; another is that it consists in increasing our understanding of the objects of study; a third is that it consists in “answering philosophical questions”; and so on.

A possible reaction that one might have to such proposals, however, is: Do we really have to choose? Might there not be more than one way in which philosophical progress can be made? After all, cases of (putative) philosophical progress really look quite different. Perhaps appearances are not deceiving. 

The main aim of this talk is to formulate and defend such a pluralist view of philosophical progress. The central idea is that the notion of progress should be seen as analogous to so-called ‘multidimensional’ notions, such as democracy and health, whose application is standardly taken to depend on a variety of considerations rather than just one. For example, whether and to what extent a country is democratic plausibly depends at least on how well it protects civil liberties, how well its government is functioning, how its electoral processes are conducted, and so on; and whether and to what extent a person is healthy plausibly depends, at a minimum, both on her physiological health on her psychological health. Similarly, on my proposal, the extent to which philosophy has made progress may depend both on the extent to which we have increased our understanding and the extent to which we have come closer to the truth, and potentially also on other things.

Registration

All interested are welcome to this event. One can come and go as one pleases. However, we’ll make reservations for dinners and for at least one of the lunches. So if one wants to join for any of that, one should send a mail saying so to: par.sundstrom@umu.se.

Organizers

Nils Franzén and Pär Sundström